The Supreme Court of Appeal’s recent judgment in Road Accident Fund v L M and Others (174/2024) [2026] ZASCA 73 (21 May 2026) provides important clarification on the limits of delictual liability in cases involving suicide.
In particular, it grapples with the difficult question of when, if ever, a defendant may be held liable for loss of support where a breadwinner takes their own life following an injury. The decision is a significant reminder of the distinction between factual and legal causation, and the role of a novus actus interveniens (or intervening cause) in breaking the chain of liability.
The facts
In this matter, the deceased was a self‑employed artisan who sustained serious orthopaedic injuries in a motorcycle collision on 21 June 2014, including fractures to his tibia and pelvis, which required surgery and resulted in lasting physical impairment, pain, and reduced earning capacity. On 6 December 2016 he died by suicide through a self‑inflicted gunshot wound.
Following his death, his widow instituted a dependants’ claim against the Road Accident Fund on behalf of herself and their minor children for loss of support, alleging that the deceased’s accident-related injuries and their aftermath caused his suicide.
The SCA’s judgment
In South Africa, causation is approached in two stages: factual and legal causation. On factual causation, the SCA asked whether the deceased would have taken his life but for his accident-related injuries and their consequences. The Court found that he probably would not have. The deceased’s injuries, pain, financial strain and emotional distress following the accident were contributing factors to his mental decline. So, factual causation was satisfied.
The real issue was legal causation. Here, the Court looked at whether the deceased’s suicide was an intervening cause that broke the chain of factual causation. As a starting point, the Court reasoned that suicide is, by default, an exercise of choice and self‑determination. It emphasised that a person with full mental capacity is legally entitled to control their own body and fate. As such, when someone deliberately takes their own life, the law does not presume irrationality or impairment, it treats the act as a conscious, voluntary decision unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Against that backdrop, the Court examined the evidence for any impairment of the deceased’s volition. It found none. Crucially, there was no diagnosis of a recognised mental illness and no evidence that he lacked the ability to understand or control his actions. While he clearly experienced frustration, pain, and emotional distress, the Court held that these feelings did not amount to a loss of mental capacity. The expert evidence also did not establish that his judgment was actually impaired.
The court also pointed to aspects of the deceased’s conduct that suggested deliberation and planning (for example, the manner in which the suicide was carried out), which reinforced the inference that he acted purposefully rather than impulsively or under a disabling condition. Combined with evidence that he was generally resilient and continued trying to support his family despite setbacks, this supported the conclusion that his actions were not the product of an incapacitated mind.
Putting this together, the Court concluded that the deceased acted with full autonomy and intention, meaning his suicide was a free, voluntary act of self‑determination. The Court therefore found the suicide to have constituted an intervening cause.
The Court then had to consider whether the intervening cause broke the chain of causation, in other words, whether the suicide closely related to the accident or was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of it.
In the particulars of claim, the deceased’s death was pleaded as a direct consequence of the injuries he sustained in the collision. However, on the facts, the Court held the suicide was too remote and not reasonably foreseeable: it happened long after the accident, and there was no psychological condition making suicide a foreseeable possibility. As such, the intervening cause broke the chain, the widow’s claim failed on legal causation. The RAF was not held liable for the dependants’ loss.
Conclusion
This case is reminder that causation is a factual enquiry. In this case, suicide was considered an intervening cause that broke the chain of causation. A different set of facts might draw the Court to a different conclusion. For practitioners, the decision highlights the critical importance of properly pleading and proving the entire causal pathway. It is essential to lead clear, reliable evidence demonstrating both how the harm factually arose and why it should, in law, be attributed to the defendant.
